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A proper logical analysis of definite descriptions must respect the truth that, in saying “The author of Individuals was knighted” a speaker is referring to just one person.  Russell was aware that, for such central cases, a satisfactory analysis of a definite descriptive phrase has to capture uniqueness, but, as I shall argue, his famous theory of definite descriptions fails to deliver on this vital requirement.  Meeting the requirement is essential to the logicist enterprise.  If it should prove impossible to translate “there is just one ...” into purely logical notation together with the primitive notation of set theory, then logicism is doomed.  The logicist enterprise, as Frege, its founding father, conceived it, was to effect a reduction of a great field of study – arithmetic -- to the basic laws of logic, thus rendering arithmetic epistemologically secure.​[1]​   Although Frege’s own attempt ended in failure, a neo-logicist program in the spirit of Frege is currently in full swing.​[2]​  If it too must fail to satisfy the requirement, then the conclusion is hard to resist  that mathematics is not essentially logic but is .... well, something completely different.
Here is a passage from “On Denoting” in which Russell identifies, and tries to satisfy, the requirement.

Take as an instance “the father of Charles II was executed”.  This asserts that there was an x who was the father of Charles II and was executed.  Now the, when it is strictly used, involves uniqueness....  Thus when we say “x was the father of Charles II” we not only assert that x had a certain relation to Charles II, but also that nothing else had this relation.  The relation in question, without the assumption of uniqueness, and without any denoting phrases, is expressed by “x begat Charles II”.  To get an equivalent of “x was the father of Charles II”, we must add, “If y is other than x, y did not beget Charles II”, or, what is equivalent, “If y begat Charles II, y is identical with x”.  Hence “x is the father of Charles II” becomes: “x begat Charles II; and `if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x' is always true of y”.  Thus “the father of Charles II was executed” becomes: “It is not always false of x that x begat Charles II and that x was executed and that `if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x' is always true of y” (Russell 1905, p.482).

Modern logicians might worry about analysing an object-language sentence as a metalinguistic one, and some would quarrel about quantifying into quotational contexts, but Russell’s central idea is clear enough:  that  to the analysis of the indefinite description, one simply conjoins the “uniqueness clause”

(y)(By  y = x)

-- where “B” abbreviates “begat Charles II” -- to obtain the corresponding definite description.
Russell renders sentences containing the indefinite description “a father of Charles II”  as “(x)(Bx ....)”, where the existential quantifier connotes “some” or “at least one”.  Does the addition of the “uniqueness clause” narrow this down to “just one”?  I shall argue that it does not.  If some (one or more) x begat Charles II, then the further information that for all y, if y begat Charles II, then y=x, tells us only that there are no more than those one or more xs who begat Charles II, not that Charles II had a unique begetter.  We have the fragment “y=x”.   Russell could certainly stipulate that the “=” sign here takes as its arguments singular terms or individual  variables, or that the quantifiers are individual quantifiers, but to make these stipulations would render his analysis otiose.  For it is surely clear that the notions of “singular” and “individual” are themselves dependent for their meaning on the concept of  “one” which is the very concept that the analysis purports to elucidate.  We would not think much of a dictionary that defined the word “nose” as “that part of the body on which nasal surgeons operate”. 
	Let us try to get clear about the problem.  Russell is essaying to define definite descriptive phrases using only logical concepts the possession of which is fundamental – these are concepts related to such fundamental abilities as the ability to pick out objects – in other words to recognize a boundary between where is and where is not object -- and the ability to deliberate -- to consider alternatives, A or B.​[3]​  Let us assume that the possession of a concept by a human is normally manifested in the person’s possessing the meaning of the associated word.  Now, what about the concept of identity?  We say that Pinsent is the stroke of the crew, but also that Redgrave and Pinsent are Britain’s favorite oarsmen – examples of singular and plural identities respectively.  Neither singular nor plural terms enjoy conceptual priority.  We can say (to take an example from Hale and Wright 2001, p.428), that Pinsent and Redgrave rowed in perfect synchronization, but that statement cannot be reduced to statements about each individual in isolation; the plural term is irreducible.   George Boolos (1984) has shown that certain sentences such as the Geach-Kaplan “Some critics admire only each other” and others containing plural forms are (as he puts it) nonfirstorderizable.
Now, if Russell has a preferred reading for the identity sign as it occurs in his analysis of definite descriptions, then he must say how the sign is to be taken.  But doing so requires making use of the very concept of uniqueness that he is trying to define.   Wittgenstein said “Russell’s error is shown by the fact that in drawing up his symbolic rules, he has to speak about the things his signs mean” (Tractatus, 3.331).  Wittgenstein was here making a point about weak inexpressibility inherent in a language containing a type hierarchy (see Potter 2000, p.169), but we can make a similar point with respect to the interpretation of the identity sign in the analysis of definite descriptions – Russell cannot simply help himself to an interpretation of the sign which requires for its understanding a concept that we are allegedly in the process of defining.
Just suppose that it did take the co-ordinated effort of several males to sire a king.  Then Russell would wish to say that the sentence “The father of Charles II was executed” is false (he holds that “The author of The Maid's Tragedy was a poet” is false on the grounds that the play was written by Beaumont and Fletcher jointly (Russell and Whitehead 1910, p.68)) yet, on his analysis (minus the “chat” in which he is not officially entitled to indulge), it comes out true.  The Russellian analysis, in logico-English, is “There is someone (one or more men) who begat Charles II and nobody other than any of them begat Charles II”.  Clearly, uniqueness is not captured in this formulation, unless “any” is read as “any one”, i.e. unless the concept one is presupposed.  Note, again, that if the existential quantifier at the beginning of this formulation were rendered “There is some one …” or “There is a unique individual …”, this would render otiose Russell’s project, for his “uniqueness clause” would have no work to do -- his way of making notational distinction between indefinite and definite article would be void.  Further,  this reading would produce the wrong ordinary language counterpart of “~(x)~(…)”.  For that formula,  definitionally equivalent to the universal quantifier “(x)(...)”, would be given the reading “It is not the case that just one individual is not …”, i..e. “More than one individual is not ...”, which is not universal; it is not “all”.
A fundamental error in Russell’s analysis springs from a confusion about the relation of the definite to the indefinite article.  Robert Brandom (1994), developing a point made by Charles Chastain (1975), notes that the indefinite description is frequently used for singular reference.  We can see this by inspecting an anaphoric chain, in which the referent of an indefinite article is picked up, elsewhere in the sentence, by a definite article or singular pronoun:

A man in a brown suit approached me on the street yesterday and offered to buy my briefcase.  When I declined to sell it, the man doubled his offer.  Since he wanted the case so badly, I sold it to him. (Brandon, 1994, p.307).

It is clear, in this example, that the speaker is referring not to several brown-suited men, but to just one.  When I say “I met a man at Victoria Station yesterday evening”, I am being indefinite about whom I met, not about how many individuals I met: you could ask me who the man was, not how many of them there were.  It is true, of course, that I could have met several men at Victoria Station the other evening, so that possibility must not be excluded by the analysis – but that does not mean that it must be included.  The proper analysis of  “I met Jeffrey at Victoria Station” is “Met (I, j, at V)” -- no explicit recognition of the possibility that I met men besides Jeffrey there is recorded in the analysis.  When I say “A man I met at Victoria Station gave me £2,000”,  I am referring to one man;  if I say “A man I met at Victoria Station gave me 50p” that may suggest that this man was just one of the men I met and that I was begging, but, even so, in what I said, I referred to just one benefactor.  (If one could devise a workable uniqueness clause, then perhaps that would be needed for the analysis of  some types of  indefinite description too.)   Phyllis (from the eponymous TV show) says to her friend “My daughter wants to marry a dwarf”, and the friend replies “There are not many dwarves in this town – she’d better advertise”.   If Phyllis’ response is “No, I was referring to that dwarf she introduced me to yesterday”, it seems natural to say that the confusion arose from an ambiguity, but, at any rate, neither participant in the conversation had in mind the possibility of a polygamous marriage in which Phyllis’ daughter was united to more than one dwarf. In fact it is rather difficult to find clear cases in which a sentence containing an indefinite description is accurately formalized with the use of an existential quantifier (although this very sentence furnishes one example).​[4]​  
	There has been some debate in the literature over whether indefinite descriptions are semantically ambiguous as between a quantificational and a referential interpretation or whether a unitary Russellian analysis is to be preferred, with the literal or default reading of the indefinite description taken to be the one captured by existential quantification and the referential use of such a description to be explained by appeal to pragmatic principles.​[5]​  Of course, if one accepts the Wittgensteinian view that meaning just is use, then this debate is undercut.  One might raise an objection to Wittgenstein, by pointing out that the meanings of certain technical words are independent of how the (ignorant) masses use them, but this point would seem not to apply to so mundane a word as “a”.   This word is, in fact, used in more ways than have so far been mentioned.  The indefinite description in the sentence “I’m all in favor of animal rights, but I will kill a spider if it frightens my wife’ is formalized with a universal quantifier.  And, in the sentence “Police in London have shot dead an unarmed man for the second time this week”, it is semantically entailed (as opposed to being pragmatically conveyed or implicated) that the police shot two men -- a numerical quantifier would be needed for the formalization of the sentence.  Ludlow and Neale (1991, pp.529-30) argue that if S utters “A convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister”, then a hearer H understands the proposition which, according to the Russellian account, S expresses, even though H may not grasp what S intends to convey, namely that it is Jones who is doing the flirting.  Perhaps we can grant this case: what the sentence expresses (as opposed to what S means when using it) may be that one or more persons convicted of embezzling are flirting with the hearer’s sister.  But, if a hearer were to understand the previous two example sentences (involving a spider, an unarmed man) as being existentially quantified propositions, then that hearer would be understanding them wrong.  Does this mean that “a” is three, four or more ways ambiguous?  We may wish to resist saying so, and it may be preferable to say simply that it is sense-unspecified.​[6]​
	Because, in standard predicate logic, the existential quantifier “(x)(…..)” is equivalent to  “~(x)~(…..)”, it connotes plurality – “not all”, “at least one”.  So the indefinite (but singular) article is not properly captured by the existential quantifier. When I tell you that I met a (unspecified) man at Victoria Station, I am not saying that not all the people I met at Victoria Station were not men; I am not saying that I met one or more men, for I am definite that I met just one, though which one I’m not saying.  The difference between an indefinite and a definite description is not that one, but not the other, is used to refer to possibly more than one individual.  Thus the project of analysing the latter by adding to the analysis of the former a uniqueness clause to narrow down the referent is misguided.
We have pointed out (in reverse order) two errors in the account of definite descriptions given in “On Denoting”: (i)  The lemma which offers an analysis of the indefinite article in terms of the existential quantifier is incorrect – it confuses “There is an unspecified individual who is F” with “There are one or more individuals who are F”.  But even if, as many authors now hold, Russell is right and indefinite descriptions are quantificational, (ii) The analysis of “There are one or more individuals who are F” is not transformed into an analysis of  “There is just one individual who is F” by the addition of Russell’s “uniqueness clause”.
	Our contention is that the Russellian analysis 

R)	(x)(Bx & (y)(By  y = x) & Cx)

-- reading “Cx” as “x was executed” or “x had his head Chopped off” – is the correct analysis not of “The father of Charles II was executed” but of 

RE)  Some (one or more) individuals begat Charles II and anyone who begat Charles II is identical with them, and they were executed.

If this is right, and if Charles II had two begetters, a and b, then R) is true.  It might be objected that, on the supposition that there are these two distinct begetters, existential instantiation of R) and &-Elimination yields

(y)(By  y = a) 

But since, similarly, existentially instantiating R) with b delivers

(y)(By  y = b)

it follows that a = b.  Yet our assumption was that a  b, so we have a contradiction.  Hence if there is no unique begetter, the uniqueness clause fails; in other words, given the truth of the uniqueness clause, there is a unique begetter, hence, after all,  Russell’s uniqueness clause works as advertised.
	This objection does not succeed; it commits the fallacy of  equivocation.  Note that in RE), each of the argument-places of  “=” was filled with a plural term.  Let us say that an identity is an s-identity if its arguments represent several (one or more) individuals.  For example:

The five wealthiest people in the U.S.A. are the five with the most political clout.

Now, the “=” in R) must be an s-identity, because the existential quantifier clause reads “There are one or more individuals who begat Charles II”.  But, in the objection above, each of the formulae alleged to be obtained from R) by existential instantiation contained an identity sign the argument-places of which had to be filled with singular terms – any such term represents just one individual.  Call such identity j-identity.​[7]​  If it is true that it took the combined efforts of Charles I and Oliver Cromwell to beget Charles II, then it is incorrect to infer that all who begat Charles II are identical to Charles I alone.  So the instantiation moves are not valid because of a shifty shift from s-identity to j-identity. The “=” in R) should, we said, be read as an s-identity.  Reading it as a j-identity, as Russell wishes us to do, would impose on the outer existential quantifier the reading “There is just one x”.  And, as previously noted, to incorporate a quantifier with this reading into a supposed analysis of uniqueness is simply a case of definiens per definiendum.
Jimmy Altham (in conversation) claimed, contrary to what I have been arguing, that the rôle of the variable in the formula “(x)(…x…)” is to select, from the domain over which x ranges, just one individual; to pick out another distinct individual, one uses another distinct variable, as in “(x)(y)(…x…y…)”.   Altham is, I believe, mistaken.  A name (if it is unambiguous) picks out just one individual, but a variable does not pick out an individual, not even an arbitrary individual.  The formula “(x)(Fx)” expands out as a disjunction “Fa v Fb v Fc v …” where the disjunction is non-exclusive.  The existential quantifier serves to select some individuals (though it is not specified which ones) from the domain of the variable; the universal quantifier serves to select all (and, again, we should have to make a stipulation if we want it to select each one, rather than selecting severally).  When two individual variables occur in a formula then, even when both range over the same domain, we have the possibility that, on any given instantiation, each picks out different individuals.
Ivor Grattan-Guinness observes:

When Augustus de Morgan and George Boole began to develop algebraic logics in the mid 19th century, they naturally used symbols from common algebra and arithmetic, such as “=”, “0”, “=0” and “+”.  But the new referents of these symbols had no connection with those of the mathematical originals, and such multiple use has steadily declined in logics; Russell himself (and Frege earlier) saw it as a source of ambiguity and misleading analogy (Grattan-Guinness, 1998, p.830).

The sign “=”, in its mathematical original, connotes j-identity; it takes as its arguments numerals or other singular number-designating expressions.  If what I have suggested above is correct, then Russell himself misleadingly conflated two types of identity when the argument-signs flanking “=” are not numerals or algebraic letters, but linguistic terms..
The interpretation of quantified formulae is so fundamental a matter that it is remarkable to discover that Russell (in his logical prime) gets it wrong.  But he is not alone.  Jaakko Hintikka contends that the rule of  existential generalization fails (Hintikka, 1999, p.139) but he commits the same  misreading of identity signs within quantifiers as does Russell.  Hintikka says that we would not accept the inference from





(2)	There is an individual such that Ari knows that he was Homer

where (2), as Hintikka observes “obviously says the same as”
	
(2)*  Ari knows who Homer was

Clearly, the singular pronoun in (2) refers back to a single individual, so (2) is not the correct generalization of (1).   “(x)(Ari knows that x was Homer)” translates into English as





	(3)*  Ari knows that someone was Homer

and the inference from (1) to (3)* is acceptable.
 	       Russell’s 1905 theory of definite descriptions is largely preserved in Principia Mathematica but with several refinements and a more elaborate technical apparatus.  In the latter work, Russell and Whitehead seek to define E!(x)(øx) so that it can be read “the x satisfying øx exists”.  They are at pains to insist that their definition is not circular --  that the definition of uniqueness does not presuppose the concept of one (Russell and Whitehead 1910, p.30).  Their proposed definition is 

E!( x)(øx). = : ( c):øx. x.x = c  Df

or equivalently, as Russell and Whitehead say, “the x satisfying øx exists” is to mean “there is an object c such that øx is true when x is c but not otherwise”.  But Russell and Whitehead are wrong to think that, in this definition, they have avoided presupposing the concept of one.  This is obvious as soon as one asks how “(c)....” is supposed to be read.  It would appear that the “c” is not to be interpreted as a variable.  According to the translation that Russell and Whitehead provide,  we are to read (c) as “there is an object c”; we do not read it as “for some value of c ...” because c is not a variable but a singular term.  A singular term?  As we have already noted,  that is just a letter that stands for one object.  So the concept one is presupposed after all.  The letter “c” appears to be functioning as a constant term -- like the letters from the beginning of the alphabet in the algebraic expression "ax2 + bx + c = 0", but, even if that was not the Russell/Whitehead intention, and their "c" was to be taken as a variable, then it would need to be read as an individual variable -- one for which only expressions for single objects may be substituted in an instantiation.
There is a blatant equivocation in Russell and Whitehead's discussion.  They vacillate between reading “a(n)” as “one” and as “some”.  They render into logico-English the formula





There is a c for which øx.x.x = c, and this c is a.

Here, the first “c” seems to demand being treated as a common noun, with the preceding phrase a standard existential quantifier, but the middle “c” is the name of an object, i.e. the name of one object.  The final “c” could be read either way.  The illusion that the formula expresses uniqueness is reinforced by the use of the singular demonstrative “this” in the logico-English version that Russell and Whitehead provide, but an illusion it remains; the formula is not even well-formed.
	Three musketeers are one plus one plus one.  In contrast, as is well known, the concept all cannot be derived from a conjunction of singular statements -- that is to say, "(x)Fx" is not equivalent to "Fa1 & Fa2 & Fa3 & …." for filling out the dots would require some such phrase as "and that is all the a's there are".   We have just argued, conversely, that, given the same apparatus, one cannot be derived from all.  Putting these results together gives us a slogan not quite as positive as that of Dumas' musketeers: you can’t get all from one nor one from all.
Even if one adds to the vocabulary of first-order logic with identity the “” of set membership, this helps not at all in characterizing the concept of uniqueness.  We don't define “one” by pointing to a single object, nor by indicating a class which has, as a matter of fact or necessity, just one member.  A concept that has as its extension a single individual will not, just in virtue of that characteristic, feature in the definition, since this concept shares that characteristic with many others; it is what all these concepts have in common (viz., that each has only one object in its extension) that is important.  As Wittgenstein puts it,

Why talk about concepts; the number, of course, depends only on the extension of the concept, and once that has been determined, the concept may drop out of the picture.  The concept is only a method for determining an extension, but the extension is autonomous and, in its essence, independent of the concept; for it's quite immaterial which concept we have used to determine the extension (Wittgenstein 1975, p123).

The concepts used for, as it were, illustrating oneness are redundant; they would not figure (except as decoration) in a definition.
Somewhat surprisingly, it has not been remarked to what extent the concept of  one is simply presupposed in theories purporting to establish the foundations of number theory. The Peano-Dedekind axiom system for elementary number theory incorporates, as a “primitive”, a function symbol which means “the successor of”.  But if m is the successor of n, that just means that m equals (n plus one).   The relation of cardinal equivalence, taken by Frege (1950) as fundamental, is just the relation of a one-to-one map.  Frege defines "zero" and "successor" in terms of second-order logic plus class abstraction, but the definition of equinumerosity (a concept needed for Hume's principle) standardly employs the "There exists just one" quantifier, "(E!)".​[8]​  The principle of induction which, as Michael Dummett (1998, p.139) notes, “is not important only as a means of proving statements about all natural numbers: it is important as serving to say what the natural numbers are”,  turns on showing that what holds for the kth member of a series holds also for the k-plus-oneth.  Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus) defines numbers in terms of the repetition of an operation (1922, 6 – 6.021).  But clearly, to repeat an operation is to do it one more time.​[9]​  The concept one is frequently smuggled in, but it never gets defined (in a non-circular way).
Tim Williamson (2000, p.3) has argued that the equation "Red = colored + X" need not have a non-circular solution.  He writes: "Although being colored is a necessary but insufficient condition for being red, we cannot state a necessary and sufficient condition for being red by conjoining being colored with other properties specified without reference to red."  In other words, "red" is unique and so, I suggest, is "one" -- the equation "One = number + X" does not have a non-circular solution..  Perhaps our understanding of “one” and the other number words springs not from their connection with any other concepts, but from an entirely different source.  Perhaps from a primordial intuition of time (Brouwer)​[10]​ or perhaps, as I shall argue, from the language-game of counting.
Number words typically occur in sentences in noun position or adjective position, and this observation fuels the expectation that numbers are objects or properties (properties not of objects, but of sets of objects).  The enquiring mind will then tend to wonder about the nature of these objects or properties, and the project of seeking definitions is underway.  But it is worth pausing to reflect that numbers were born not for naming or property-ascribing, but for numbering off (counting), and number words occur in a count neither as nouns nor as adjectives; we have merely a series of distinct sounds in a fixed order.  Infants learn to recite the first part of this series and, for them,  the sounds initially have no more meaning than do the sounds in a tune.  At a later stage, when numbering off a collection of objects, a child, like Wittgenstein’s ponderous grocer,​[11]​ takes any one of the objects, says the first word in the series -- “one” --, puts that object aside and proceeds to another object and to the next word in the series.  The useful trick with number words is to take the last-uttered word in a particular count as a measure of the size of the collection.  Pleasing results start to flow when we do such things as merging counted collections and re-counting the whole.  Of course, when we log such results as equations of arithmetic, we abstract from the particular acts of counting.
It is of some interest to speculate about the provenance of the fetish for defining numbers in terms of quantificational logic – why was that thought to be an important enterprise?  The answer, I think, can be traced back to Aristotle's invention of logic as a tool for keeping check on scientific arguments.  Science deals with universal hypotheses and particular observations, so it is natural to give notational prominence to the concepts all and some.  The sentence-types featuring in Aristotelian syllogistic are either universally or existentially quantified sentences, and this type of logic held sway for two thousand years.  Part of the logical behavior of the universal and existential quantifiers is captured in the algebra invented by Boole for transcribing syllogistic sentences into equations, and the quantifiers form the cornerstone of Frege's Begriffsschrift.  Russell, as heir to that tradition, attempted to give a quantificational analysis of definite descriptions.  The theory was of major significance for his own work because (temporarily, at least) it seemed to give him a way out of Russell's Paradox (armed with the theory, one can deny that there is some object answering to the description “the class of all and only the non-self-membered classes”), and it was the first step towards constructing mathematics from logic -- from an analysis of unique to a definition of one to arithmetic, geometry and the rest of mathematics.  This picture of mathematics as constructed on a foundation of logical definitions and axioms is one that modern mathematicians do not recognize (McCarty 1993; Hintikka 1996) and we can now begin to see that the superstructure -- a house of many mansions, a motley of techniques – need not be connected to any such foundation.
A rather fundamental objection could be made to the strategy I have employed in this paper.  It might be pointed out that Russell's analysis of the definite description does not actually use the term “one'; that term is, as it were,  in the wings, and an opponent might want to say that if a definition of X does not use X, but, at most, X gets mentioned in an optional explanation of some of the terms used in the definition, then the definition is not circular.  It might be claimed that explanation must be distinguished from definition.  Russell's little nephew is sceptical of this suggestion, if the following dialogue is to be believed:
Russell: "The F is G" means "There is an x such that…….
Nephew:  But, Uncle Bertie, what's "x"?
Russell: It's an individual variable, of course.
Nephew: What's an individual variable?
Russell: It's a letter that gets instantiated by singular terms.
Nephew: But what's a singular term?
Russell [exasperated]: It's a term that stands for just one object.
Nephew: Why didn't you say that at the beginning?  Why didn't you say that "The" is like "A" except that, with "The F" there is only one of them?
Russell: Because I wanted to avoid using "one" in the definition.
Nephew: But you've used it in the explanation, so what's the good of that?  Your definition isn't much use.

	Is the nephew's insolent rebuke justified?  I have suggested that it may be.
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^1	  .  See Frege (1950), § 3.
^2	  .  The canonical text is Hale and Wright (2001).  See also Demopoulos (1995) and Tennant (1997).  For an overview of logicism and neo-logicism, see Shapiro (2000, pp.107-139).
^3	  .  See Price (1990), Humberstone (2000) on “not”, and Evnine (2001) on “or”.
^4	  .  Another example (for which I’m indebted to Andy McGonigal):  I say to my bookmaker “A Scottish team will get into the European Champions’ League next year”.   Here, what I and my sentence mean is that at least one Scottish team will win through to the Champions’ League. 
^5	  .  See, for example, Ludlow and Neale (1991) versus Fodor and Sag (1982).  What is in dispute is whether indefinite descriptions sometimes pick out an individual.  This divides into two problems, one concerning the picking out (“Does an indefinite description occurring in a sentence sometimes behave like a demonstrative or a proper name, so that, in order to grasp the content of the sentence we have to be able to identify what is picked out?”), the other concerning uniqueness (“If  an indefinite or a definite description  occurring in a sentence denotes just one – as opposed to at least one – individual, does the language of quantifier logic possess the resources to reflect this fact in a symbolic representation of that sentence, without presupposing the concept of uniqueness?”).
^6	  .  For a thorough discussion of the criteria for ambiguity, see Atlas (1989), esp.pp.44-81.
^7	  . There is also a mongrel case, that I shall not consider here, where one term is singular, the other plural, as in "The gold medal winning crew is Pinsent and Redgrave".
^8	 .  Problems about founding arithmetic on Hume’s Principle and second-order logic are discussed by Black (2000).
^9	 .  See Goldstein (1999, p.510).  Michael Potter (2000, p.179) comments: "It is quite hard, in fact, to describe [Wittgenstein's] operator Ω at the level of sense in a way which does not make a circular appeal to the natural numbers, and Wittgenstein certainly does not trouble himself with the details".
^10	 .  See Brouwer's essay “Intuitionism and Formalism” in his (1975).  The primacy of number was also recognized by Wittgenstein in  his “transitional period” MSS where he employs numerical quantifiers such as “(E3x)” and defines the familiar standard quantifiers in terms of these.  See e.g. his 1975, pp. 124-6 (footnotes).
^11	  .  See Wittgenstein (1953, § 1).
